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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE- KANAB FREIGHT
LINES, INC., a corporation,
Plaintvjf,

-vs.PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH and HAL S. BE.NNETT,
DONALD HACKING, and JESSER.
S. BUDGE, Commissioners of the
Public Service Commission of Utah
and A. B. ROBINSON, doing business
as A. B. ROBINSON TRUCK
LINES,
Defendants.

No. 8941

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This brief is before the Supreme Court in support
of a Pet:Ltion for Rehearing upon the decision of this
Court filed May 13, 1959, affirming an order of the Public Service Commission of Utah, which granted to defendant A. B. Robinson, dba A. B. Robinson Truck Line, contract carrier permit No. 475. This reahearing is urged
upon the court not in consideration of the economic ef-
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fects as to Plaintiff of the of the Public Service Commission which was affirmed by the decision of this Court,
but rather because of the far-reaching and disasterous
effect of the unprecedented legal theory announced in
the decision.

STATEMENT OF POINT AND ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
ORDER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION UPON
THE UNPRECEDENTED LEGAL THEORY THAT CONTRA:CT CARRIER AUTHORITY WILL BE GRANTED IN A
SITUATION WHERE SUCH GRANT WILL NOT DEPRIVE
AUTHORIZED COMMON CARRIERS OF TRAF'FIC THEY
ARE NOT AT THE TIME OF THE APPLICATION TRANSPORTING. SUCH A PROPOSITION IS CONTRARY TO THE
LAW AND COMPLETELY ABANDONS THE .CONCEPT OF
PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY AND ADEQUACY OF EXISTING SERVICES AS PREREQUISITES TO
A GRANT OF AUTHORITY AS PROVIDED IN SECTION
5'4-6-s, u.e.A. 1953.

In its opinion affirming the decision of the Public
Service Commission, :the court said:
"Here the evidence indicates that the granting of this contract carrier authority will not deprive the common carrier of any business, but
the contract carrier will only haul freight which
the contractees have in the past hauled in their
own trucks and which they clain1 they will haul
in the future if the contract carrier authority is
not granted, because they claim they can haul this
freight in their own trucks for less than the plaintiff com1non carrier rates."
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The implications of this language extend far beyond
the economic considerations involved in this case. In effect the court has abandoned the requirements of convenience and necessity and a showing of inadequacy of
the service currently supplied by common carriers, which
have long been established in the law of this 8tate. (See
Wycoff Co. v. Public Servvce CommiJssion, 227 P. (2d)
323 (1951); Rudy v. Public Service Commission, 265 P.
(2d) 401 (1954) ; Goodrich v. Publvc Service Commiss~on,
198 P.(2d) 975, (1948); McCarthy v. Public Service Commission, 198 P. (2d) 220, (1947). All a contract carrier
applicant need show under the decision of this Court is
that the commodity for which he seeks authorization is
not a;t that time being transported by a protesting common carrier for the shipper for whom he proposes to
transport. Such a holding will restrict the common carriers of this State to the commodities and volume of
traffic they are transpo:rlting as of the date of this opinion. As a practical matter the flow of traffic to and from
any common carrier is in a constant state of flux. Shippers, for one reason or another, may cease the use of
common carriers or have no further need for their services, yeJt at the same time other shippers may commence
the use of such transportation service. If the theory of
motor carrier regulation is to be logically followed, it
must adhere to the concept that an existing carrier shall
be permiJtted to transport commodities for the shipping
public where it has the facilities and the express willingness and ability to do so. The mere fact that a contract
carrier may, by virtue of its limited operations, be able
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to initially tender service at a slightly reduced rate has
uniformly been rejected as the basis upon which a grant
of authority might be allowed. The reasons for such concept are obvious. As of the date of any hearing on an
application for contract carrier aulthority, the parties
have presumably entered into a contract providing,
among other things, for the rate which will be charged
for the transportation service. This is, however, nothing
more than a proposal, and such raltes are subject to adjustment at any time in the event that they prove inadequate. The granting of a contract carrier permit is not
one necessarily authorizing service under the peculiar
circumstances which exist at the moment of its issuance,
but is a continuing authorization subject to change during future operations under its terms.
In the instant case the shipper has attempted to
support the application upon the premise that it will
utilize its own trucks in the transportation movement unless the author~ty is granted, and the argument is then
advanced that this can have no real effect upon protesting common carriers. The intent of any shipper witness
today, the length to which he may go in testimony of this
type, constitutes no obligation as to the method of transportation in the future. The decision in this case is
extremely dangerous in its concept that the mere threat
of a shipper to utilize his own equip1nent if the contract
carrier authority is not granted, is sufficient to justify
a grant of authority. If this case were considered as an
isolated instance, the economic impact on the plaintiff
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herein is admittedly of a limited extent. If, however, the
rule of this case is accepted as sound regulatory practice,
it will open the door :to a flood of cases based upon the
above concept. There would appear no limit to the grants
of contract carrier permits which may be issued. This
traffic moves primarily in truckload lots and is clearly
the most desirable :traffic. Such a diversion, if allowed
to expand, will mean that the common carriers who are by
law compelled to transport any commodities tendered to
them by the shipping public, will find themselves in a
declining economic situation which can only result in
a substantial reduction in service offered to the public
or total cessation of common carrier service. In a State
such as Utah wherein substantial areas are served exclusively by truck, and rail facilities are not available, the
detriment to the shipping public is obvious.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has for many
years administered the Interstate Commerce Act in which
is found a declaration of the National Transportation
Policy. The basic concept of utility regulation as embodied in such Act is essentially the same as that found
in the statutes and in the decisions interpreting the same
in the various states, including Utah. While it is recognized that the decisions of such Commission are not binding upon this court, it is nevertheless believed that in
view of the extensive experience of the Commission and
its specialization in this particular field its decisions
should be of substantial persuasive force. Such Commission has freq·uently had occasion to consider cases
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factually similar to the case before the court, and has
held that the mere fact that the protesting common carrier is not at the time of application transporting commodity for the shipper involved cannot sustain a grant
of contract carrier authority. Rather, the Commission
has held that such traffic must be first tendered to the
common carrier to determine whether or not the services
rendered by it are adequate. The decided cases of the
Commission are numerous and consistent, and a few will
suffice to show the regulatory concepts.
The case of Arthur B. Jarrell-Norfolk, Virginia;
No. BC 19917 (Sub. No. 1) ; 11 FCC 33, 615, involved a
situation similar to that in the instant case. The shipper
had not utilized the available facilities of protestant common carrier and was supporting the contract application.
In denying the application, the Interstate Commerce
Commission said:
"·The evidence establishes that there is available motor common carrier service from Pittsburgh to Norfolk which has not been used or
otherwise shown to be inadequate in any material
respect. * * * we would not be fostering a sound
transportation system by refusing to allow an
existing carrier to obtain additional traffic."
Again in Monterrey Freight Forwarding Corporation Contract Carrier .Application; No. MC 115437; 12
F·CC 33, 757, where as in this ease, the shipper ·had used
proprietary equipment rather than ship with the available common carriers, the Commission denied the contract application and said:
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"As seen, the record clearly indicates that an
abundance of service is available to meet the
needs of the sole supporting witness. Instead of
using these services, the supporting witness has
turned to the operation of proprietary equipment.
It is our opinion that if afforded the opportunity
the opposing carriers could and would provide
adequate service to handle the traffic here involved."
Citing again from the Interstate Commerce Commission,
in C & E Trucking Corporation, Extension-Whole Condensed Milk; No. MC 111435 (Sub. No. 13); 12 FCC 34,
024, where the protestant motor common carrier was not
transporting the milk involved, the Commission denied
the contract application and said:
"Since we have found that protestants hold
appropriate authority, and since no deficiency or
disability has been shown in their service, we believe that they should be afforded an opportunity
to transport the considered traffic before a new
service is authorized in competition with them."
Many other cases could be cited supporting this well
established principle of law. It is inherent in the concept
of regulation of the motor carrier industry that the requirement that a carrier provide adequate service contemplates that the shipping public must use such service so long as it is adequate and that a single shipper
cannot obtain for himself additional services because he
does not choose to use that provided. Monopolistic rights
are granted and rates regulated by the State on the pre-
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mise that the carriers granted these rights will be protected in their exercise of them. The motor carrier industry does not purport to operate under a theory of
completely independent competition. Protestant herein
has expended considerable sums of money in equipping
itself to meet the needs of the entire shipping public in
the area in which it is authorized to serve. It has supplied services which are fully adequate to meet the needs
of the shipper here involved. That the shipper may be
dissatisfied with the rates offered is a matter which he
should take up with the Public Service Commission, the
rate regulating body of the State. This is the remedy
the law has established for such complaints.
A stable transportation system is an important requisite to a sound economy of this State. The rule of
this case can only promote confusion and strife in the
transportation industry in Utah. Common carriers will
be deprived of a sound policy of regulation which has
allowed them to provide at great expense the facilities
and service now available to the public. Such a rule will
needlessly stunt the growth of the common carrier industry and will induce 1nany speculative and unwarranted
entries into the contract carrier field.
While the amount of traffic at issue in this particular case is insignificant in the transportation picture of
the entire State, the i1nplications of the rule of the case
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extend far beyond the interests of the parties hereto.
Such a decision should not be permitted to stand.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted that this Court should
reconsider this case in light of the unprecedented rule
of law which, without citation or authority, was dropped,
off hand, into the decision. Such a rule is completely
contrary to the general rule of law and the rule which has
pertained in Utah from the inception of motor carrier
decisions and legislation.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN F. PIERCEY and
WOOD R. WORLSLEY, and
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW
& CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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